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Abstract 
In this paper, we assess the impact of fiscal consolidation on income inequality. Using a 
panel of 18 industrialized countries from 1970 to 2010, we find that income inequality 
significantly rises both during periods of fiscal consolidation and in the aftermath of 
such adjustments. In addition, fiscal authority that is driven by spending cuts seems to 
be more detrimental for income distribution than in the case of tax hikes. Considering 
the linkages between banking crises and fiscal consolidation, we show that the impact 
on the income gap is amplified when fiscal adjustments take place after the resolution of 
such financial turmoils. Our results also provide support for the Kuznets relationship 
and corroborate the idea that trade can lead to a more unequal distribution of income. 
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“Growing inequality is a “key test” for market economy.” 
Mario Monti, 17 May 2009 
 
1. Introduction 
The most recent financial turmoil that emerged in 2008 led to a quick and 
aggressive response by monetary authorities with the aim of boosting the economy. 
However, its deepening and severity associated with the collapse and massive 
destruction of asset wealth made visible that large fiscal stimulus programs should be a 
key additional ingredient of the policy mix. As a result, fiscal authorities in many G20 
countries implemented comprehensive support packages based on expenditure hikes 
which, combined with cyclical revenue losses, resulted in sharp increases in budget 
deficits. 
More recently, the uncertainty regarding the economic path and the concerns 
about long-term (un)sustainability of public finances has supported in a relatively 
consensual way the view about the need to withdraw such stimulus and the emergence 
of the implementation of budgetary consolidation measures. This should, in turn, deliver 
a return to more “normal” fiscal stances and sustain the path of debt growth. 
In this context, it is interesting to investigate the impact of fiscal consolidations 
on income inequality. In fact, while some literature has been devoted towards 
addressing the linkages between fiscal consolidation and economic growth, there is an 
important gap regarding our understanding of the effects of such fiscal programs on the 
distribution of income. 
Will fiscal austerity measures increase inequality or contribute to a more even 
distribution of income? To which extent does such relationship depend on whether 
fiscal consolidation is led by spending cuts or tax hikes? Is it more likely to affect 
income inequality when undertaken during a severe financial crisis or afterwards? 
These questions have gained a renewed momentum in recent times, especially, if 
one takes into account that, in order to deal with financial crises, governments have 
employed a broad range of policies, which reallocated wealth toward banks and debtors 
and away from taxpayers. We aim at providing the answers to the abovementioned 
questions in this work. 
We find that during periods of fiscal consolidation, income inequality 
significantly rises. Moreover, fiscal adjustments that are led by spending cuts tend to 
have a more detrimental impact on income distribution than those driven by tax hikes. 
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Similarly, we show that the top 1% income share in total income increases after 
consolidation. As a result, post-consolidation periods are also associated with more 
inequality. 
When we condition the effects of fiscal consolidation on the role played by 
banking crises, the empirical findings suggest that: (i) in the absence of crises episodes, 
fiscal austerity leads to a more unequal distribution of income; (ii) if fiscal consolidation 
is implemented during banking crises, the impact on inequality is negligible; and (iii) in 
the aftermath of a banking crisis, fiscal consolidation substantially rises income 
inequality. Therefore, the impact on the income gap is amplified when fiscal austerity 
takes place after the resolution of banking crises. 
In addition, the evidence supports the Kuznets relationship, that is, while per 
capita GDP has a significantly positive effect on inequality, the square of per capita 
GDP has a negative impact. This gives support to the idea that the benefits of the early 
stages of economic development accrue only to a small share of the population, while 
further increases in per capita GDP eventually reduce inequality. 
Finally, we show that the degree of openness of a country is positively related 
with income inequality. That is, despite the indirect negative effect of trade on income 
inequality (via boosting economic growth), its direct impact is positive. Therefore, 
although trade may be determinant in lowering poverty, it also leads to more disparity in 
the income distribution. 
The rest of the paper is organized as following. Section 2 reviews the literature 
on fiscal consolidation. Section 3 presents the data and describes the methodological 
approach. Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 looks at the relationship 
between fiscal consolidation, banking crises and income inequality. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Review of Literature 
There is a relatively large number of works looking at the potential impact of 
fiscal consolidation on economic growth. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) challenge the 
common wisdom about the existence of a positive fiscal multiplier. The authors argue 
that fiscal consolidation adjustments can have an expansionary impact on the economy 
via the so-called non-Keynesian effects (Feldstein, 1982). In the same line, Cour et al. 
(1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998, 2010), Miller and Russek (2003) show that growth 
performance is improved after periods of drastic and decisive spending cuts. 
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Interestingly, Heim (2010a, 2010b) shows that government deficits crowd out both 
private consumption and investment. However, while government spending deficits are 
associated with a complete crowding-out effect (i.e. no net stimulus impact), tax cut 
deficits result in net negative economic effects. 
From a theoretical point of view, expansionary effects of fiscal adjustments can 
work via both the demand and the supply side. On the demand side, a fiscal adjustment 
may be expansionary if agents believe that the fiscal tightening eliminates the 
expectations about the need of further adjustments in the future (Blanchard, 1990). 
Similarly, increases in taxes and/or spending cuts that are perceived as permanent help 
supporting the belief that the stabilization is credible and avoids a default on 
government debt. As a result, a lower premium on government bonds may be requested 
and the associated (positive) wealth effect can boost private spending (Alesina and 
Ardagna, 2010). In addition, the strong negative relationship between government 
deficits and private spending can operate via credit shortages that are induced by public 
sector borrowing (Heim, 2010c). On the supply side, expansionary effects of fiscal 
adjustments work via the labor market and via the effect that tax increases and/or 
spending cuts have on the individual labor supply in a neoclassical model, and on the 
unions‟ fall-back position in imperfectly competitive labor markets (Alesina and 
Ardagna, 1998; Alesina et al., 2002).
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Regardless of their impact on GDP, another crucial issue from a policy 
perspective is whether cutting spending or raising taxes is more likely to result in a 
stable fiscal stance and subsequent economic growth when a fiscal consolidation is 
carried out. According to Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Alesina and Ardagna (2010), a 
fiscal consolidation is successful if the reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio is sufficiently 
large and persistent. Alesina and Ardagna (2010) show that tax cuts are more 
expansionary than spending increases in the cases of a fiscal stimulus. In addition, 
spending cuts are much more effective than tax increases in stabilizing the debt and 
avoiding economic downturns. These results are partially attributable to a more 
substantial monetary stimulus following a fiscal adjustment that is spending-based 
rather than tax-based. In fact, central banks are less likely to loose monetary policy 
                                                 
1
 Interestingly, Hernandez de Cos and Moral-Benito (2011) suggest that this positive link may simply 
reflect that consolidation episodes are endongenous to GDP. Putting it differently, the likelihood of public 
finance consolidation can rise as the result of the expectation of an economic recovery, which is stronger 
during the trough of the cycle. When these biases are taken into account, the authors find that adjustments 
in the fiscal stance have a negative effect on GDP growth. 
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when revenue-driven measures (such as indirect tax hikes) that raise prices are already 
in place.  
Tackling a more general question dealing with the effect of fiscal policy on the 
economy, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) find that positive government spending shocks 
increase output, consumption and decrease investment, while positive tax shocks have a 
negative effect on output, consumption and investment. Mountford and Uhlig (2009) 
also point to a negative effect on private investment associated to both taxes and 
spending increases, but spending increases do not generate an increase in consumption. 
Moreover, deficit-financed tax cuts are found to be the most effective way to stimulate 
the economy. Afonso and Sousa (2011a) show that government spending shocks 
generally have a small effect on GDP and lead to important crowding-out effects. 
Afonso and Sousa (2011b) find that unexpected variation in fiscal policy can 
substantially increase the variability of housing and stock prices. Using narrative 
approaches, Ramey (2008) challenges the positive effect of government spending 
shocks on private consumption. Romer and Romer (2010) also find that an increase in 
taxation has a small negative effect on GDP. 
The literature presented so far has typically addressed the impact of fiscal 
adjustments on the level or the growth rate of aggregate income. However, the sharp 
increase in deficits and quick debt build up that have been recently observed in many 
developed countries - as a result of the fiscal response to the most recent financial 
turmoil - are now calling for a return to “normal” times via the implementation of fiscal 
austerity. This brings a new question into the scene: what is the impact of fiscal 
consolidation on income distribution? 
Up to now, only a few studies have looked at the distributional effects of fiscal 
policy. Bertola (2010) argues that Europe‟s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) had 
a small (althout significantly positive) impact on income inequality, partially reflecting 
the implementation of less generous social policies. In the same vein, Bouvet (2010) 
uses data for a set of European regions and finds that, while income inequality has 
decreased (mainly because of a fall in between-country inequality), the establishment of 
the convergence criteria widened the income gap in less advanced countries. Some 
research has also highlighted that fiscal consolidations: (i) run together with an increase 
in poverty and a rise in the income gap (Ford, 1998; Smeeding, 2000); and (ii) impact 
on the trade-off between economic growth and income inequality (Mulas-Granados, 
2005). 
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Moreover, the discussion has been centred on how income inequality changes in 
the outcome of a banking crisis. From a theoretical point of view, financial crises can 
lead to bankruptcies and falls in asset prices, generate deep recessions and demand 
policy responses such as bailouts, but their effects on inequality are not clear (Atkinson 
and Morelli, 2011). From an empirical perspective, the 1929 crash was followed by a 
substantial correction in inequality, because wealth losses and financial reforms hit the 
top of income distribution.  
In this context, Stiglitz (2009) suggests that the combination of stagnant real 
incomes and increased borrowing by low income households leads to an unsustainable 
path that makes default and financial crises more likely. Freeman (2010) finds that 
inequality increases dramatically before financial crises. More recently, Agnello and 
Sousa (2011) show that banking crises substantially impact on income distribution, 
rising inequality before the event eclodes and sharply declining it afterwards. The 
authors also suggest that a better access to credit provided by the banking sector leads to 
a more equal distribution of income, but the size of the government does not reduce 
inequality per se. 
The recent financial crisis seems to have witnessed a slight fall in income gap, 
but there is no clear trend on how it will evolve in the future as it depends on the groups 
that are affected and where they are in terms of the income distribution. Notably and as 
pointed by Jenkins et al. (2011), in the case of the Great Recession, countries with a 
relatively strong welfare state did observe a more stable income distribution as a result 
of a greater automatic stabilisation. However, there is a growing sentiment that the 
coming fiscal austerity measures are somewhat unfair and, as the authors emphasize, 
they are likely to have a dramatic impact on inequality. For instance, Ball et al. (2011) 
estimate that a 1 percent of GDP of fiscal consolidation leads to a fall in inflation-
adjusted wage income by 0.9 percent, while inflation-adjusted profit and rents are 
reduced by 0.3 percent. Rather than judging about the merits of such policies, our paper 
tries to provide a comprehensive description of the effects of fiscal consolidation on 
income inequality. 
 
3. Data and Methodological Approach 
We use annual data for 18 industrialized countries and the sample period is 
1970-2010. 
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Gini inequality index data comes from the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID). As highlighted by Nolan et al. (2009), this measurement 
of income and wage inequality improves comparability across different studies. More 
specifically, while accounting for the concept, definition of income and recipient unit, it 
captures different points in the distribution and measures income inequality levels and 
trends in a harmonised way. Similarly, as pointed by Solt (2009), it provides a greater 
cross-country and temporal coverage. 
We focus on two different income definitions, i.e. gross or net of taxes. 
Therefore, significant gaps between inequality in gross and net income help explaining 
the differences in redistributive policies across countries. As shown in Figure 1, this 
might be particularly important for the advanced economies included in our sample, as 
the panel correlation between the gross and the net income inequality indexes is 
relatively low (0.37). 
 
[ INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE ] 
 
Data for per capita GDP and the degree of openness are provided by the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank and the Penn World Table (PWT) Version 
7.0, respectively.
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Finally, the IMF fiscal consolidation episodes are identified from the work of 
Devries et al. (2011), which is based on a narrative approach. As argued by the authors, 
the standard statistical approach focuses on variation in the cyclically adjusted primary 
budget balance (CAPB). However, this framework can lead to biased results for two 
main reasons. First, the CAPB may suffer from measurement error that can be 
correlated with economic developments. Second, it omits periods during which fiscal 
consolidation actions were followed by adverse shocks and offsetting discretionary 
measures. For these reasons, we use the narrative approach to identify episodes of fiscal 
consolidation. More specifically, rather than looking at fiscal outcomes, we follow 
Devries et al. (2011), who assess policy actions that are motivated by deficit reduction 
by examining accounts and records of what countries were intending to do at the time of 
publications (such as the IMF Recent Economic Developments reports, the IMF Staff 
Reports or the OECD Economic Surveys). Therefore, this procedure eliminates the 
                                                 
2
 See Heston et al. (2011). 
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endogeneity of the response of fiscal policy to the economy, as it captures 
policymakers‟ decisions. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, fiscal adjustments typically involve substantial 
variation in income inequality measures. Moreover, there is a reasonably large number 
of countries for which fiscal consolidation programs were carried out with a significant 
increase in inequality. This is the case, for instance, of Finland, Italy, Spain and Sweden 
in the nineties, where aggressive austerity measures amounting up to 3-4 percent of 
GDP  were implemented (OECD, 2008; Devries et al.,2011), or Germany, Japan and 
Portugal in the eighties, where fiscal consolidation totalled, approximately, 0.4-1.4 
percent of GDP. 
 
 [ INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE ] 
 
In order to explore the empirical relationship between gross and net income 
inequality measures and fiscal consolidation, we use a Seemingly-Unrelated-Regression 
(SUR) system under unbalanced panel data (BiØrn, 2004; Nguyen, 2009). A similar 
approach is used in a cross-sectional context by Barro (2008). 
Compared to single equation methods, this technique has two main advantages. 
First, it allows to simultaneously analyze the dynamics of different (comparable) 
measures of income inequality and their „seeming’ relationship at country level. Second, 
it achieves gains in terms of efficiency by estimating a system of equations rather than 
looking at each equation separately (Baltagi and Chang, 1994). This is particularly 
important in the context of an unbalanced panel data and constraints regarding the 
number of observations as is the case for inequality indexes. 
We estimate a system of two equations for an unbalanced panel of N countries, 
indexed by i = 1, …, N, that is:  
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where each equation has its own dependent variable (i.e., either the net income Gini 
inequality index, nety , or the gross income Gini inequality index, grossy ) and a 
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(potentially) different set of exogenous explanatory variables, X . i  and itu  denote, 
for each equation, the country-specific effects and the disturbance terms, respectively.   
Following Barro (2008), X includes a core set of variables that have been found 
strongly related with income inequality, namely, the log of per-capita GDP and its 
squared term (which is used to test the Kuznets relationship) and the trade openness. In 
addition, we consider a variety of dummy variables capturing fiscal consolidation 
episodes, Dx, and aimed at assessing the relationship between income inequality and 
fiscal adjustments. 
We account for the timing of the potential redistributive effects of the adopted 
austerity measures by using two dummy variables labelled as Dc and Dpc. Based on 
Devries et al. (2011), the first one takes the value one during periods of fiscal 
consolidation and zero otherwise. The second one takes the value of one over the two 
years after the implementation of austerity measures and zero otherwise. Moreover, we 
analyze the contribution of spending versus tax-driven consolidation programs by 
constructing two alternative dummy variables, Dcs and Dcr: following Devries et al. 
(2011), Dcs takes the value of one if the adopted austerity measure is driven by a 
spending cut and zero otherwise; Dcr  takes the value of one if the adopted austerity 
measure is driven by an increase in taxation and zero otherwise.  
We remark that the abovementioned dummy variables enter only the net income 
inequality equation. In fact, the set of consolidation measures consists of discretionary 
changes in taxes (increases) and government spending (cuts), which are designed to 
reduce the budget deficit. Therefore, one can only infer about the effects of fiscal 
consolidation on income inequality after deducting direct taxes and social security 
contributions from gross income (i.e., by looking at the net income figures). More 
formally, this implies that we restrict the coefficients associated to the dummy 
variables, Dx, in the vector gross  to be equal to zero. 
 
4. Empirical Findings 
Table 1 provides a summary of the results using the net and gross SWIID Gini 
Index as the measure of income inequality. Column 1 focuses on the IMF consolidation 
periods, Column 3 looks at IMF tax driven and spending driven consolidation episodes, 
and Column 5 addresses IMF consolidation and post-consolidation periods. 
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Our findings show that income inequality increases during periods of fiscal 
consolidation (as one can see in Column 1). Moreover, the evidence suggests that fiscal 
adjustments that are driven by the revenue side do not help reducing the income gap. 
Interestingly, when fiscal consolidation is achieved via spending cuts, income inequality 
seems to widen even more (see Column 3). In fact, the coefficient associated with 
spending-driven consolidation episodes (0.046) is almost three times larger than the one 
linked with tax-driven fiscal adjustment programs (0.017). These results are close in 
spirit with the argument by Ball et al. (2001) that fiscal consolidation reduces the wage 
share in total income. The authors suggest that, while the effect on wage income is 
persistent, the fall in capital and property income is short-lived. This can be explained 
by the fact that fiscal austerity plans typically call for a fall in public sector wages or 
lead to an increase in unemployment (in particular, long-term unemployment) via the 
decrease in government consumption or the cut in government investment. As a result, 
although spending cuts can be more effective (than tax increases) at promoting a 
stabilization of the debt and boosting economic growth in the medium-term (as Alesina 
and Ardagna (2010) argue), they are also more likely to lead to an increase in the 
inequality of income distribution (as pointed by Mulas-Granados (2005) regarding the 
European case). 
We also find that income inequality significantly increases after consolidation 
periods. As shown in Column 5, the distribution of income becomes more uneven after 
the fiscal adjustment, as the coefficient associated with the post-consolidation period is 
statistically significant and positive (0.014). 
Additionally and in line with Barro (2008), our results also point to the usual 
Kuznets relationship i.e. an inverse U-shape curve between income inequality and per 
capita GDP. In fact, while the coefficient associated with per capita GDP is significant 
and always exhibits a positive sign, the estimates for the impact of per capita GDP 
squared are negative in magnitude. As a result, for low levels of income, a rise in per 
capita GDP increases income inequality. However, for sufficiently high levels of 
income, one observes the opposite relationship: a boost in per capita GDP reduces 
inequality. This result actually holds for both definitions of income inequality. 
Also in accordance with the findings of Barro (2008), we show that an increase 
in the degree of openness of a country leads to more divergence in the distribution of 
income and, thereby, trade seems to be an important source of inequality. In this 
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context, Agnello and Sousa (2009) also find that public deficit volatility is magnified in 
countries with a high degree of openness. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE ] 
 
As robustness check, in Table 2, we consider the top 1%, 5% and 10% income 
shares as measures of inequality. Such data has been compiled by Atkinson and Piketty 
(2010) and covers a large number of OECD countries. The results are broadly in line 
with those presented in Table 1, in particular, when we consider the impact of fiscal 
consolidation on the top 1% income share.  Column 1 shows that consolidation periods 
are typically linked to a rise in income inequality: the coefficient associated with 
consolidation periods is statistically significant and positive (0.058). Moreover, fiscal 
adjustments that are led by spending cuts tend to widen the income gap by more than 
those driven by rises in taxation, as shown in Column 4. In addition, the top 1% income 
share in total income rises after consolidation, i.e. post-consolidation periods are 
associated with more inequality (as can be seen in Column 7). 
As before, we find evidence supporting the Kuznets relationship. In fact, while 
there is a significantly positive effect on inequality from the log of per capita GDP, the 
square of the log of per capita GDP has a negative impact on inequality, a result that is 
in line with the work of Barro (2008). As argued by the author, at the early stages of 
economic development (which include the adoption of new technologies and shifts from 
agriculture to industry and services), an increase in per capita GDP raises inequality 
because the benefits accrue to a small share of the population. However, as the new 
methods of production become widespread, this relation flattens at sufficiently high per 
capita GDP, and the benefits are shared more evenly. As a result, further increases in 
per capita GDP reduce inequality. 
Finally, more open economies seem to be characterized by higher levels of 
income inequality, as the coefficients associated with the degree of openness are 
positive and statistically significant for a broad range of regressions. Note that while the 
direct effect of openness on income inequality is positive, the fact that trade boosts 
economic growth means that there is also an indirect effect on inequality. This is 
embedded in a higher level of per capita GDP, which reduces income inequality over 
time in most countries. As a result, enhanced trade can lower poverty even if income 
inequality rises (Barro, 2008). 
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5. Fiscal Consolidation and Banking Crises 
A number of authors analyzed the link between income inequality, household 
debt leverage and financial crises, and emphasized the role of credit demand (Rajan, 
2010; Reich, 2010) or credit supply (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2010; Levitin and Wachter, 
2010) in explaining the high debt levels of households at the bottom of income 
distribution. For this reason, Hubbard (2010) argues that policymakers appear to be 
responsible for the latest crises. 
Similarly, Moss (2009) investigates whether huge income gaps create “wrong” 
incentives that increase the vulnerability of the financial system. Blair (2010) shows 
that, because asset bubbles typically lead to higher returns, the banking system has the 
potential to generate highly leveraged systems and increase inequality. 
From an historical perspective, banking crises typically preceded or coincided 
with sovereign debt crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). Some reasons for this pattern 
can be associated with the contingent liability argument, whereby the government steps 
in and takes on massive debts from the private banks, which ultimately undermines its 
own solvency (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985; Velasco, 1987). Another potential explanation 
lies on the “twin crisis” story, where banking crises occur before currency crashes and 
these may, in turn, lead to the insolvency of sovereign borrowers who hold large 
amounts of foreign-currency denominated liabilities (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999).  
Whatever the theoretical ground underlying the temporal sequence between 
banking crises and sovereign debt crises is, the need to restore fiscal sustainability 
afterwards forces governments to reduce their budget deficits via the implementation of 
fiscal consolidation programs. As a result, we investigate the impact of such fiscal 
adjustments undertaken during and after the occurrence of financial crises as identified 
by Laeven and Valencia (2010) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). 
More specifically, we assess the conditional dependence of the redistributive 
effects on the occurrence of financial crises. To that end, the consolidation dummy 
variable, Dc, as defined in Section 3 is interacted with the series dating banking crisis as 
provided by Laeven and Valencia (2010) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). We also 
construct a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the fiscal consolidation 
measures are adopted immediately after the end of banking crises. 
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Table 3 provides a summary of the findings. The empirical evidence provides 
some interesting results. First, when fiscal consolidation is implemented during banking 
crises, the impact on inequality is not statistically significant. Second, in the absence of 
crises episodes, fiscal austerity leads to a more unequal distribution of income: the 
coefficients associated with consolidation programs during no banking crises are 
statistically significant and positive for both the identification based on the work of 
Laeven and Valencia (2010) – i.e. 0.019 – and the research by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2011) – i.e. 0.033. Third, in the aftermath of a banking crisis, fiscal consolidation has a 
strongly positive impact on income inequality. That is, compared to the benchmark case 
of no banking crises, the impact on the income gap is magnified when austerity plans 
are implemented after the resolution of banking crises. 
 
[ INSERT TABLE 3 HERE ] 
 
6. Conclusions 
After the substantial reduction in public deficits during the nineties and early 
2000s, the fiscal stance of many OECD countries has strongly deteriorated. Similarly, 
while until early 2010 policymakers questioned whether tax cuts or spending increases 
were a better recipe for boosting the economy, the subsequent developments in 
government bond markets signalled doubts about the long-term sustainability of the 
debt path and led to the implementation of fiscal austerity. 
In this paper, we look at fiscal consolidation via the lenses on its impact on 
income inequality. We find that the income gap indeed increases during periods of fiscal 
adjustment. Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests that when fiscal austerity is 
driven by the spending side rather than the revenue side, inequality rises more. 
In addition, we show that the distribution of income becomes more uneven not 
only during the fiscal consolidation period, but also after the adjustment is put into 
place.  
Conditioning the impact of fiscal consolidation on the occurrence of a banking 
crisis, we find that income becomes much more unequally distributed in the post-crisis 
period. However, even in the absence of crises episodes, we do observe a rise in 
inequality associated with the implementation of fiscal consolidation.  
Finally, we confirm the existence of a nonlinear inverse-U relationship between 
inequality and growth and also show that the higher the degree of openness of is, the 
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higher the level of inequality will be. As a result, although trade can help countries to 
achieve long-term economic prosperity, it also seems to lead to a rise in income 
inequality.  
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Table 1. Income inequality and fiscal consolidation 
(Evidence from the SWIID net and gross Gini Index). 
 Dependent Variable 
Explanatory variable Gini Index (SWIID) 
 Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross 
log (per capita GDP) 0.118*** 0.165*** 0.149*** 0.202*** 0.106*** 0.144*** 
 [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] 
log (per capita GDP) squared -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Consolidation periods (Dc) 0.026***    0.026***  
 [0.003]    [0.003]  
Tax driven consolidation episodes (Dcr)   0.017***    
   [0.005]    
Spending driven consolidation episodes (Dcs)   0.046***    
   [0.004]    
Post-consolidation period (Dpc)     0.014***  
     [0.004]  
Openness 0.038*** 0.028*** 0.052*** 0.022** 0.025*** 0.031*** 
 [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] 
       
Observations 626 626 626 626 626 626 
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Tests:       
Ho: Dcr=Dcs   23.98    
   (0.00)***    
Ho: Dc=Dpc     5.79  
     (0.02)**  
Note: Dependent variables are  Gini coefficients. Coefficients are estimated by seemingly-unrelated regression technique in a panel 
framework (BiØrn, 2004). Standard errors of coefficients are in square brackets, p-values in parenthesis.   
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Table 2. Income inequality and fiscal consolidation 
(Evidence from the top income shares). 
 Dependent Variable 
Explanatory variable Top Income shares 
 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
log (per capita GDP) 0.892*** 0.843*** 0.444*** 0.911*** 0.860*** 0.472*** 0.800*** 0.883*** 0.513*** 
 [0.116] [0.194] [0.126] [0.117] [0.193] [0.127] [0.121] [0.188] [0.132] 
log (per capita GDP) squared -0.054*** -0.051*** -0.030*** -0.055*** -0.052*** -0.032*** -0.050*** -0.053*** -0.034*** 
 [0.006] [0.011] [0.007] [0.006] [0.011] [0.007] [0.007] [0.010] [0.007] 
Consolidation periods (Dc) 0.058***      0.108***   
 [0.002]      [0.003]   
Tax driven consolidation (Dcr)    0.046***      
    [0.004]      
Spend driven consolidation (Dcs)    0.065***      
    [0.002]      
Post-consolidation period (Dpc)       0.181***   
       [0.003]   
Openness 0.238*** 0.163*** -0.016 0.237*** 0.173*** -0.01 0.294*** 0.210*** 0.086*** 
 [0.013] [0.034] [0.019] [0.013] [0.035] [0.019] [0.016] [0.044] [0.023] 
          
Observations 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 338 
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Tests:           
Ho: Dcr =Dcs    21.77      
    (0.00)***      
Ho: Dc=Dpc       422.4   
       (0.00)***   
Note: Dependent variables are  top income shares. Coefficients are estimated by seemingly-unrelated regression technique in a panel 
framework (BiØrn, 2004). Standard errors of coefficients are in square brackets, p-values in parenthesis.   
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Table 3. Income inequality and fiscal consolidation 
(Evidence for banking crises episodes). 
 Banking crises Identification 
 Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) Laeven and Valencia (2010) 
 Net Gross Net Gross 
log (per capita GDP) 0.114*** 0.164*** 0.148*** 0.179*** 
 [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] 
log (per capita GDP) squared -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.006*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Consolidation (IMF) during banking crises -0.003  0.008  
 [0.008]  [0.011]  
Consolidation (IMF) after banking crises (A) 0.035***  0.104***  
 [0.006]  [0.012]  
Consolidation (IMF) during no banking crises (B) 0.019***  0.033***  
 [0.004]  [0.004]  
Openness 0.037*** 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 
 [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] 
Number of consolidation episodes:     
During banking crises  84  11  
After banking crises 64  29  
During no financial crises 25  133  
     
Observations 626  626  
Number of countries 18  18  
     
Tests:     
Ho: A=B 5.22  34.52  
 (0.00)**  (0.00)***  
Note: Dependent variables are  Gini coefficients. Coefficients are estimated by seemingly-unrelated regression technique in a panel 
framework (Biorn, 2004). Standard errors of coefficients are in square brackets, p-values in parenthesis.   
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Figure 1. Gross and net income Gini Indexes. 
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Note: The blue line denotes the gross income inequality index, while the red line corresponds to the net income inequality index. Both 
series are expressed in log terms. The correlation between gross and net income inequality is relatively low (0.37). This is not 
surprising for advanced countries where, in contrast with developing countries, differences in redistributive policies are much more 
relevant at explaining differences in net inequality. 
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Figure 2. IMF consolidation episodes and net income Gini Index. 
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Note: The red line denotes the annual change in the net income Gini Index (on the right axis), while the shaded regions 
correspond to the IMF fiscal consolidation episodes (on the left axis). 
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